AS6第十二讲 未来不确定世界战略管理风险预警的阳民建议：罗永浩与贾跃亭案例讨论（本学期最后一次课）

时间：本周周四（2022年5月12日）8:00-17：40（午休2个小时10分钟）；

地点：老校区19号楼316教室；

主讲：阳民 博士；

内容目录：

1，阳民公司战略与风险管理期末考前训练，《【Ayoungman】阳民公司战略与风险管理大案例讲义》P112-115.

2，Strategy Making and risk management in an future Unpredictable World from Ayoungman Suggestion.

案例分享【由学委抽签两个班的案例讲解顺序】：

第一个案例：罗永浩

问题1：罗永浩2006年7月31日发起创办的牛博网的商业模式是什么？商业模式画布是怎么布局的？？

问题2：罗永浩2012年5月创办锤子科技并于2014年5月20日正式发布锤子手机，他是如何进行市场细分的？如何理解罗永浩的战略定位？

问题3：罗永浩对锤子手机的战略意图、愿景使命理解与消费者期许有什么差异？为什么？

问题4：罗永浩的锤子手机战略是否成功？为什么？回顾锤子手机的生命周期，有哪些重大风险没有预先评估和预警应急？

问题5：罗永浩2020年3月26日发布最新微博和抖音视频正式宣布抖音成为其独家直播带货平台，从耀眼的企业家转型为带货网红是否会成功？战略转型背后的管理学逻辑和经济学逻辑分别是什么？？

问题6：罗永浩2022年1月回归科技界并进军元宇宙方向创业，如果你是罗永浩的第一管理顾问，你如何帮助罗永浩分析“元宇宙”创业并经营的各种风险？？

第二个案例：贾跃亭

问题1：贾跃亭事业起步是1996年在垣曲县舜王大街开办卓越实业公司还是2002年创建山西西贝尔通信科技有限公司？为什么？企业的文化基因密码是什么？

问题2：贾跃亭2008年创建乐视电影公司（乐视影业）是2004年创建乐视网信息技术股份公司的什么类型的多元化战略？为什么？

问题3：贾跃亭2012年9月19日推出自有品牌智能电视乐视TV超级电视机是顺应时代潮流还是逆反时代潮流？是什么类型的扩展性战略？有什么重大的战略风险？

问题4：贾跃亭2015年4月14日推出乐视超级手机系列，是采用什么方式进军新产业领域?有什么优势和劣势？存在什么重大的战略风险、财务风险、经营风险、法律风险和市场风险？

问题5：贾跃亭2021年7月22日创办的电动汽车公司法拉第未来正式在纳斯达克挂牌（股票代码FFIE）并于2022年4月贾跃亭将继续担任首席产品官一职，是否表明贾跃亭复出了？为什么？贾跃亭的重大战略失误属于什么类型的风险？

问题6：贾跃亭在繁盛时期他的企业版图是如何布局的？如何勾画他的商业模式画布图？由什么重要的成功之处和重大风险？

内容介绍：

*[CASE]In the mid-1990s, Charles Schwab was the most successful discount stockbroker in the world. Over 20 years, it had gained share from full-service brokers like Merrill Lynch by offering deep discounts on the commissions charged for stock trades. Although Schwab had a nationwide network of branches, most customers executed their trades through a telephone system called Telebroker. Others used online proprietary software, Street Smart, which had to be purchased from Schwab. It was a business model that worked well; then along came E*Trade.E*Trade was a discount brokerage started in 1994 by Bill Porter, a physicist and an inventor, to take advantage of the opportunity created by the rapid emergence of the World Wide Web. E*Trade launched the fi rst dedicated Web site for online trading. E*Trade had no branches, no brokers, and no telephone system for taking orders; thus it had a very low-cost structure. Customers traded stocks over the company’s Web site. Due to its low-cost structure, E*Trade was able to announce a fl at $14.95 commission on stock trades, a fi gure signifi cantly below Schwab’s average commission, which at the time was $65. It was clear from the outset that E*Trade and other online brokers, such as Ameritrade, which soon followed, offered a direct threat to Schwab. Not only were their cost structures and commission rates considerably below Schwab’s, but the ease, speed, and fl exibility of trading stocks over the Web suddenly made Schwab’s Street Smart trading software seem limited and its telephone system antiquated.Deep within Schwab, William Pearson, a young software specialist who had worked on the development of Street Smart, immediately saw the transformational power of the Web. Pearson believed that Schwab needed to develop its own Web-based software, and quickly. Try as he might, though, Pearson could not get the attention of his supervisor. He tried a number of other executives but found support hard to come by. Eventually he approached Anne Hennegar, a former Schwab manager who worked as a consultant to the company. Hennegar suggested that Pearson meet with Tom Seip, an executive vice president at Schwab who was known for his ability to think outside the box. Hennegar approached Seip on Pearson’s behalf, and Seip responded positively, asking her to set up a meeting. Hennegar and Pearson turned up expecting to meet with just Seip, but to their surprise, in walked Charles Schwab; the chief operating officer, David Pottruck; and the vice presidents in charge of strategic planning and the electronic brokerage arena.As the group watched Pearson’s demo of how a Web-based system would look and work, they became increasingly excited. It was clear to those in the room that a Web-based system using real-time information, personalization, customization, and interactivity all advanced Schwab’s commitment to empowering customers. By the end of the meeting, Pearson had received a green light to start work on the project. A year later, Schwab launched its own Web-based offering, eSchwab, which enabled Schwab clients to execute stock trades for a low flat-rate commission. eSchwab went on to become the core of the company’s offering, enabling it to stave off competition from deep discount brokers like E*Trade.

**[Strategy Making and risk management in an future Unpredictable World from Ayoungman Suggestion]

Critics of formal planning systems argue that we live in a world in which uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity dominate, and in which small chance events can have a large and unpredictable impact on outcomes.19 In such circumstances, they claim, even the most carefully thought-out strategic plans are prone to being rendered useless by rapid and unforeseen change. In an unpredictable world, there is a premium on being able to respond quickly to changing circumstances and to alter the strategies of the organization accordingly. The dramatic rise of Google, for example, with its business-model-based revenues earned from advertising links associated with search results (the so-called pay-per-click business model), disrupted the business models of companies that made money from online advertising. Nobody foresaw this development or planned for it, but they had to respond to it rapidly. Companies with strong online advertising presences, including Yahoo.com and Microsoft’s MSN network, rapidly changed their strategies to adapt to the threat posed by Google. Specifi cally, both developed their own search engines and copied Google’s pay-per-click business model. According to critics of formal systems, such a fl exible approach to strategy making is not possible within the framework of a traditional strategic planning process, with its implicit assumption that an organization’s strategies need to be reviewed only during the annual strategic planning exercise.